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INTRODUCTION 
Helena De Preester 
Some introductory comments to the topic of the distinction between inside 
and outside, and the attending topic of boundaries, seem specially useful 
in presenting the subject matter of this issue. Indeed, and in spite of the 
deliberately kaleidoscopic whole, one major thought runs through the 
sequence of contributions. 
Almost everything we can think of or imagine exhibits insides, 
outsides and boundaries. To think in terms of boundaries, inclusion and 
exclusion forces itself upon us. It seems to be a matter of necessity. 
There are two basic ways in which the phenomenon can be approached. 
Both of them imply a certain limiting perspective on the subject matter 
of the inside/outside distinction. 
On the one hand, we can start from the given phenomenon. Things 
in general, including we all, present boundaries, interiors and exteriors. 
We can classify them, observe or manipulate them. We can ask for the 
status or function of boundaries, interior and exterior for the thing at 
issue . We can try to trace the coming about or origins of insides and 
outsides, and the way in which they are maintained by the thing at hand. 
We can wonder how certain systems succeed in establishing insides, 
outsides and boundaries, and how they mark themselves off from their 
environment. Philosophers inspired by biological sciences and dynamic-
systems-theories employ a perspective in which the phenomenon is 
approached objectively, from the front side. 
On the other hand, we can try to look at the backside of the objective 
phenomenon, and ask how it is possible that we necessarily perceive and 
think in terms of inside/outside distinctions and boundaries. It is the 
Kantian style of reasoning, in which the necessary conditions of 
possibility for a certain perspective are being tracked. In other words, 
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this line of research looks for the subjective conditions of possibility of 
the above objective perspective. To trace the conditions of possibility of 
a certain perspective, allows us to ask whether the perspective at issue is 
adequate. Once we are aware of the constitutive conditions of a certain 
perspective, the road for commenting, criticizing or changing the 
perspective is open. 
However, it would not be pertinent to arrange the contributions to 
this issue according to this divide, for in trying to do so, two odd twists 
appear. The first one is familiar and does not offer much surprise 
anymore. The phenomenon taken objectively in the first approach turns 
out to be connected to the subjectivity of the second approach. 
The second twist is a bit more tied up, and it is here that a 
justification for focusing on inside/outside matters in connection to living 
beings - individually or in community - comes in sight. Living beings 
are exemplary cases of beings that bring about insides, outsides and 
boundaries. Once the complexity of a living system and its actively 
constituting part in maintaining its coherence, integrity and functionality 
is acknowledged, the distinction inside/outside and the issue of boundaries 
becomes particularly interesting. For how does a living bring about 
insides/outside and boundaries - not only of itself, but of things in 
general? The genesis and the functioning of the inside/outside distinction 
are of basic importance for this question, as they learn us something 
about the conditions of the capacity to relate oneself to something other, 
both in the first living cells which differentiate between themselves and 
their environment, and in humans as multi-layered living systems. The 
role of the living system in the differentiation between inside and outside 
is in the first place an active one. First, a living system must constitute 
itself as something cohesive in order to relate to something other. Second, 
there is maintenance of coherence, integrity and functionality of the 
system in interaction with its environment. The emphasis on the study of 
living systems as beings that try to realize the conditions of their 
continued existence - biologically as well as psychically or socially - can 
contribute to answering the question for the genesis and continuation of 
the distinction between inside and outside, and for the status and 
functionality of a boundary. 
This, however, is only a partial justification for limiting the issue to 
living beings. The other part of the justification explains why a divide 
between so-called objective and subjective approach is not useful. To 
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study from the objective perspective how living beings constitute insides, 
outside and boundaries precisely enables us to learn more about our own 
subjective conditions for distinguishing outside and inside. It is not only 
the case that distinguishing inside from outside has subjective conditions 
of possibility, it is also the case that we see the subjective conditions of 
possibility at work in the phenomenon studied from an objective 
perspective. This situation is rather exceptional and makes it difficult to 
disentangle front and back side of the phenomenon. After all, the 
researcher who studies how living beings constitute insides, outside and 
boundaries, first has to draw boundaries himself. What is to be 
considered as a living system or as a whole? What belongs to it and what 
does not? Why do we think the boundary for a living system is to be 
situated such and so? Those are the same questions and tasks the living 
being faces. This moebius-strip like convergence of front and back in the 
domain of the living suggests that the neat distinction between subjective 
conditions of possibility and objective result is rather artificial. The 
recognition, however, of this artificiality in no way opens up the way for 
relativism. This becomes clear in each of the individual contributions. In 
investigating the inside/outside distinction and matters of boundaries, each 
author - from his own, particular perspective - implicitly or explicitly 
leads us to recognizing the intertwinement of subjectivity and objectivity, 
and does so against relativist tendencies. 
This issue combines contributions from different fields, as to get a 
better grip and understanding of the all-pervading yet eluding 
phenomenon of insides, outsides and boundaries. The first contribution 
focuses on the inside/outside distinction from a biological, dynamic-
systems-theoretical perspective and establishes a naturalized account of 
how certain systems are capable of making the required inside/outside 
distinctions for their maintenance as a system. Alvaro Moreno & Xabier 
Barandiaran start from the pertinent position that the adoption of a 
particular point of view does not necessarily lead to relativism. In other 
words, it is not because the decision what is to be considered as a system 
results from a certain perspective, that the observer's choice happens at 
random or arbitrarily. Starting from this point of view, the authors offer 
us an intriguing account of the origin of the inside/outside distinction and 
the role of the boundary in living systems. 
The second contribution by myself focuses on the implications of the 
epistemological perspective and shows that matters of internality and 
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externality are based upon and mediated by a particular part-whole 
metaphysics. The underlying choice for a particular part-whole 
metaphysics, however, has consequences for what can count as part and 
as whole. Different sorts of objects need different kinds of perspectives 
from which the particularity of the object can become visible. 
Alan Rayner focuses on our perception on space and reality and 
speaks out for an alternative view on space, natural form and boundaries. 
As such, he criticizes the logic underlying our conventional point of view 
on reality (such as a rationalistic perspective on discrete objects), and 
defends an inclusional logic (with emphasis on reciprocally coupled 
insides and outsides through intermediary spatial domains). This keen 
contribution thus emphasises the subjective implications of the perception 
of objective reality, and points to the consequences for daily scientific and 
social reality. He nicely shows that relativist claims - which lead to 
denying access to natural reality - are not in place here, because they are 
precisely based on the 'box logic' rejected here. 
From another point of view, Bernhard Waldenfels approaches 
modernity, in which the cosmic order is under question and in which 
compromises between individualism and holism, particularism and 
universalism, relativism and absolutism are general practice. Against this 
turning around alternatives, Waldenfels defends a constitutive paradox of 
seljbounding orders. In this, the status of the boundary is one of self-
reference and self-withdrawal, and produces an asymmetry with the alien. 
The alien is that which continually challenges our individual and 
collective existence, and makes the borderlines visible. 
The last contribution goes back to the individual person and tackles 
the question why the inside/outside distinction is so obvious or 
commonsensical for the rest of us, but so problematic for patients with 
schizophrenia. Aaron Mishara bases his investigation on philosophy, 
literature and neurosciences, and shows that inner/outer experiences are 
not merely ways of talking that, in turn, shape our experience. 
Neurological and psychiatric disorders may disturb or disrupt the 
commonsensical inside/outside distinction, and this shows that the brain 
systems and process that underlie such experiences are both tenacious and 
frail. Once more, we are invited to recognize the hidden twist: the 
commonsensical oppositions we commonly use to describe mental 
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experience are often uncritically applied to our understanding of how the 
brain works. 
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